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PRESENTMENT
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7:
Every bill which shall have passed the Senate and the Assembly
shall, before it becomes a lav, be presented to the governor; if he
approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his
objections to the house in which it shall have originated, which
shall... proceed to reconsider it... [iff any bill shall not be
returned by the governor within ten days (Sundays excepted) after
it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in
like manner as if he had signed it ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino1
(decided December 28, 1995)
Appellants, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, et. al., brought this
appeal contending that the New York State Senate violated the
constitutional mandates of Article IV, section 7 of the New York
State Constitution,2 as well as the New York Court of Appeal's
decision in King v. Cuomo,3 in failing to present the Maintenance
of Effort Bill #3248 to the Governor for his review and possible
signing into law.4 The Appellate Division, Third Department
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court, Albany County
holding that the bill which was passed by both houses of the
legislature, but was not presented to the Governor, did not
1. 1995 WL 761930 (N.Y. Dec. 28, 1995).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7. This section states in pertinent part:
Every bill which shall have passed the Senate and the Assembly shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor; if he approve, he
shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house
in which it shall have originated, which shall... proceed to reconsider
it ... [i]f any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it ....
Id.
3. 81 N.Y.2d 247, 613 N.E.2d 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1993).
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violate the New York Constitution.5 The Third Department
further rejected the petitioners' contention that the Senate's
failure to present the bill to the Governor was contrary to the
decision in King v. Cuomo,6 finding that it did not raise the
separation of powers concerns of the "bicameral recall practice"
and because the bill had remained within the control of the
legislature. 7
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals framed the issue as
"whether the State Constitution mandates that a bill passed by
both houses of the Legislature be presented to the Governor." 8
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate
division, holding that the Senate's failure to present the bill to the
Governor violated the Presentment Clause of the New York State
Constitution. 9 The court also held that withholding passed bills
while conducting discussions is similar to the unconstitutional
"recall" practice at issue in King and, thus, ran afoul of the King
decision. 10
The Maintenance of Effort Bill was passed by both the Senate
and the Assembly during the 1994 Legislative term.I 1 It was not,
however, presented to the Governor before the legislative session
had ended. 12 The Supreme Court, Albany County dismissed the
5. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 209 A.D.2d 80, 84, 625
N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (3d Dep't), rev'd, 1995 WL 761930 (N.Y. Dec. 28,
1995).
6. 81 N.Y.2d at 250, 613 N.E.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 919. In King,
the New York Court of Appeals determined that
[t]he bicameral 'recall' practice used by the Legislature to reacquire [an]
Assembly [bill] ... from the Governor's desk is not authorized by
article IV, § 7 of the New York State Constitution. The Constitution
prescribes the respective powers of the Executive and Legislative
Branches as to how a passed bill becomes a law or is rejected.
Id.
7. Campaign, 209 A.D.2d at 82-83, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
8. Campaign, 1995 WL 761930, at *1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id. at *1. The bill was passed by the New York State Senate on March
8, 1994 and the Assembly on June 6, 1994. Id.
12. Id. At the trial court level, the respondents claimed that the suit was
moot because a bill passed by both houses must have been presented to the
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PRESENTANT1
petitioners' original article 78 proceeding, finding that they did
not have standing to bring the action, and held that they failed to
state a cause of action absent a constitutional provision which set
forth a time period under which bills passed by the legislature
must be presented to the Governor. 13 The Third Department
affirmed, finding that the choice of whether to present a bill for
gubernatorial review "should be left to the purview of the
legislature."14
On appeal, the appellants argued that the practice of
withholding a bill passed by both houses of the legislature
violated Article IV, section 7 of the New York State Constitution
in that it "effectively block[ed] Executive action in approving or
vetoing" the legislation. 15 Thus, the appellants contended the
legislature should have been constitutionally required to present
the bill to the Governor and, therefore, overstepped its powers by
not doing so. 16 The appellants further argued that "such [a]
procedure violat[ed] the principles of separation of powers and
open, accountable government," and, therefore, the Presentment
Governor during the term in which it was passed. Campaign, 209 A.D.2d at
82, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 332. In addressing the respondents' mootness claim, the
Third Department recognized that a "bill lapses when a session of the
Legislature has ended," but found that the constitutional implications of the
"law-making process" excepted the claim from the mootness doctrine. Id. The
court addressed the constitutional issue because it found "the factors necessary
to invoke the exception to the mootness doctrine: (1) a likelihood of repetition,
either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) a
phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or
important questions not previously passed on ... " were present. Id. at 82,
625 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33. The court, therefore, addressed the petitioners' claim
on the merits. Id. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the
petitioners' claims notwithstanding the lack of judiciability, but held that "a
retroactive ruling in the instant case is not warranted." Campaign, 1995 WL
761930, at *3.
13. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 162 Misc. 2d 398, 401,
617 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1994), aft'd, 209 A.D.2d
80, 625 N.Y.S.2d 331 (3d Dep't), rev'd, 1995 WL 761930 (N.Y. Dec. 28,
1995).
14. Campaign, 209 A.D.2d at 83, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
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Clause "should be read to contain an implied 'rule of reason' as
to the time for presentment of a bill to the Goveror."' 17 The
respondents contended that they were not constitutionally
compelled to present a bill to the Governor absent a mandate
requiring them to do so and, thus, argued that the New York
Court of Appeals should affirm the order of the appellate
division. 18
As in the previous actions, the petitioners' arguments in this
case were based primarily upon the rationale adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals in King.19 In King, the court of appeals
held that the bicameral "recall" procedures used by the
legislature to reacquire bills which had not been signed or
rejected by the Governor were unconstitutional and contrary to
the language of Article IV, section 7 of the New York State
Constitution.20 The appellate division in Campaign distinguished
King on the grounds that in Campaign the legislature had not
exhausted its powers upon the bill because they did not submit it
to the Governor for executive approval. 2 1 The court found that
the issues surrounding the bicameral recall practice in King did
not exist in Campaign22 and, consequently, the legislature "acted
within its legislative prerogative in retaining the bill." 23 The
court of appeals reversed the Third Department's decision in
Campaign and held, consistent with King, that "the practice of
withholding from the Governor these bills on which both houses
17. Id.
18. Campaign, 1995 WL 761930, at *2.
19. Id.
20. King, 81 N.Y.2d at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
21. Campaign, 209 A.D.2d at 83, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing People v. Devlin, 33 N.Y. 269, 277 (1865)). In King, the
Third Department acknowledged the "rule making" power of the legislature as
outlined in Devlin under Article III, Section 9 of the State Constitution, but
found their power to recall the bill ceased after submission to the Governor.
King, 81 N.Y.2d at 251, 613 N.E.2d at 952, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920. Citing the
rationale in Devlin, the New York Court of Appeals stated that once a bill was
passed by both houses and sent to the Governor for approval, the legislature
"ha[s] exhausted their powers upon it." Id. at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597
N.Y.S.2d at 921 (citations omitted).
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PRESENTMENT
of the Legislature have formally acted is violative of Article IV,
[section] 7."24 The court of appeals stated that "[tihe former
recall practice allowed legislators, executive agencies and
interested groups additional opportunity to influence and affect
bills without public inquiry or examination." 25 Likewise, the
court found the legislative practices here were "just another
method of thwarting open, regular governmental process," and
similarly violative of the State Constitution.26
In determining the constitutionality of the legislature's decision
not to present the bill, the court of appeals disagreed with the
Third Department's decision which focused upon the absence of a
constitutional mandate requiring presentment and their refusal to
dictate legislative policy by inferring a constitutional presentment
requirement. 27 The court of appeals held that the language of
Article IV, Section 7 of the State Constitution implicitly requires
that all bills passed by both houses be presented to the Governor
"for enactment into law or vetoing within a reasonable time after
its passage." 28 The court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise
would be to sanction a practice where one house or one or two
persons, as leaders of the legislature, could nullify the express
vote and will of the People's representatives." 29 Furthermore,
they found that requiring presentment under these circumstances
would not interfere with the "usual and appropriate" law-making
functions of either the Legislative or Executive Branches. 30
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the respondents'
contention that, since the legislature had not yet presented the
bill, it was still under their control. 31 The court found that the
wording "before it becomes law" contained in the Presentment
Clause does not give the legislature unbridled discretion as to
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when presentment should take place. 32 In support of their
holding, the court relied on similar federal cases containing an
analogous mandate. 33 Thus, it was found that the legislature's
withholding practice was an unconstitutional use of their
authority and concluded that once a bill has been passed by both
houses, Article IV, Section 7 requires the bill be presented to the
Governor for executive action. 34
32. Id.
33. Id. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 402 (1990)
(interpreting the Presentment Clause of the United States Constitution to
require that "every" bill passed by both houses of Congress, even "improperly
originated bills," be presented to the President for possible signing into law);
see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892) (specifying the manner in
which a bill is deemed to have been approved by both houses as the "signing
[of the bill] by the speaker of the house of representatives, and by the president
of the senate," and stating that once such procedure is completed "its
authentication as a bill that has passed congress should be deemed complete
and unimpeachable" and, thus, the bill must be presented to the President for
action).
34. Campaign, 1995 WL 761930, *3.
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